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Previous studies on the representative role compare representatives’ behaviors with individuals’ 
behaviors. Nevertheless, since representatives are a particular type of group members, previous 
designs inevitably did not distinguish between in-group favoritism effects and the actual effect of 
the representative role. Carrying on this methodological criticism, the present thesis suggests a new 
experimental design aimed at disentangling the two effects. Specifically, this study’s aim is to 
causally determine the effect of the representative role on individuals’ cooperation and understand 
which mechanisms foster the representation effect. To do so, an online experiment was conducted 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The results show that neither the in-group favoritism effect nor the 
effect of the representative role alone seem to have any significant influence on participants’ 
cooperative behaviors, but by conducting the same analysis done by previous studies a decrease in 
cooperation for representatives can be detected. However, previous interpretations are criticized and 
the decrease in cooperation is attributed to the interaction between the representation effect and the 
in-group favoritism effect and not to the representation effect alone. Additionally, self-reported data 
collected in the post-experimental survey displays that representatives do feel accountable for the 
represented group mates and, therefore, are willing to equally share their payoff. Finally, for future 
studies, this research suggests the use of more efficient minimal group procedures to better 
understand the isolated representation effect and the use of actual behaviors to investigate the 
mechanisms that lie at the basis of the representative role. 
 
Keywords: representative role, in-group favoritism, Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), 
responsibility, accountability, implicit justification, minimal group, intergroup interaction, 
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1 Introduction 
In real life, individuals rarely behave in a neutral environment; actors’ decisions are often 
influenced by the context in which they find themselves. As a matter of fact, actors often enact roles 
in society, which influence their behaviors. Indeed, individuals can be responsible for their families, 
they can be managers of corporations or they can represent nations and behave accordingly. All 
these situations actually display how actors often represent someone and how the representative role 
is far from irrelevant in our society and in our everyday life. Being a representative means having 
the responsibility to decide not only on behalf of yourself, but also for a group or a person you are 
representing. Indeed, as representatives, individuals do not only act on behalf of their own interests, 
but they also have to consider the interests of the people they represent. What is of interest in these 
situations is to answer to the question of whether the representative role affects the way in which 
individuals behave in relation to others or influences the way in which individuals cooperate1. 
Studies on cooperation demonstrated that some people care about being cooperative (Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999) and that they like to be perceived as fair (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). However, 
by changing the context of the interaction and by making individuals be responsible for a group, 
studies displayed a decrease in cooperation (Song, Cadsby, and Morris 2004; Diekmann 1997). 
Thus, the representative role seemed to influence the way in which actors cooperate.  
Nevertheless, there are no findings that demonstrate that there is a difference between 
representatives’ and simple group members’ behaviors. Therefore, the literature that tries to study 
the effect of the representative role on individuals’ behaviors suffers from a methodological 
shortcoming: to causally determine the effect of the representative role, representatives’ cooperative 
behaviors are compared to individuals’ behaviors. This comparison does not consider the fact that 
representatives are members of a group with specific functions. Comparing representatives’ with 
simple individuals’ cooperation level does not isolate the effect of the representative role from the 
well-known in-group favoritism effect. The in-group favoritism effect infers that individuals prefer 
their in-group members to out-group members (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002). Thus, the 
existence of an intergroup context alone influences individuals’ cooperative behaviors. To causally 
establish the effect of the representative role, then, representatives’ cooperative behaviors have to 
be compared to group members’ behaviors.  
																																																								
1 With representatives’ cooperation – and group members’ cooperation later in the text – is intended cooperation with 
non-represented group members or out-group members. 
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The aim of this thesis is to compensate for this shortcoming by investigating the real effect of 
the representative role on individuals’ cooperation level and detaching it from the in-group 
favoritism effect. In order to do so, I suggest a new experimental design and test it in an online 
experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The experiment consists in a dictator game conducted 
using the strategy method and a post-experimental survey allowing the collection of additional 
information. Furthermore, my interest also lies in researching the way in which the representative 
role influences individuals’ cooperation. Indeed, I test two possible mechanisms related to the 
representative role against each other: the accountability and the implicit justification mechanisms. 
Thus, by addressing the methodological shortcoming of previous studies, this thesis tries to answer 
two questions: Does being a representative of a group member make you less cooperative? And 
which mechanism lies behind the effect that the representative role has on individuals’ cooperation? 
The results reject the influence of both the in-group favoritism effect and the effect of the 
representative role on individuals’ cooperation level separately. This suggests that group members’ 
cooperation level does not differ neither from normal individuals’ nor from representatives’ 
cooperative behaviors. However, a discussion on the procedure applied to establish an intergroup 
context will question these results in relation to the inefficacy of the experimental treatment used. 
Nevertheless, by conducting the same comparison used in previous studies, representatives 
behaving in an intergroup context are found to be significantly less cooperative than individuals 
interacting in an interpersonal situation. On the basis of the developed methodological criticism, a 
new interpretation of these results is suggested: the influence is caused by the interaction between 
the in-group favoritism effect and the effect of the representative role, not by the representation 
effect alone. 
Finally, the findings support the thesis that at the basis of the effect of representation lies the 
accountability mechanism. Representatives seem to feel accountable for the represented in-group 
members and care about their payoff.  
The thesis will start with a contextualization of the research focus within the literature on 
representation. Subsequently, the theoretical part will address the social identity theory (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979) and the two theoretical mechanisms related to the representative role. In the 
following, the methodological section, the most suitable design aimed at testing the developed 
hypotheses will be presented; hence, the method used, the setting and the structure of the online 
experiment will be addressed. In the subsequent chapters, the results will be displayed and 
discussed. Finally, the conclusion will suggest some possible future studies based on aspects which 
surfaced in this paper.    
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2 The State of the Literature 
The effect of the representative role has been studied for a long time from different theoretical 
perspectives. Specifically, there are two main theoretical traditions investigating the phenomenon of 
representation: negotiation studies and studies fostering game theoretical approaches.  
On the one hand, the first theoretical tradition is focused on negotiations and the resolution of 
conflicts. These studies conduct experiments portraying situations in which representatives have to 
agree on distributional issues (Druckman, Solomon, and Zechmeister 1972; Trötschel, Hüffmeier, 
and Loschelder 2010) or agree on which of the groups’ solution to a problem is the best (Blake and 
Mouton 1961). Assuming that representatives feel responsible for their in-group members, the 
effect that being a representative has on the time needed to reach an agreement, the numbers of 
deadlocks occurring in the negotiations or the equality of the compromise is investigated (for an 
overview see Druckman 1994).  
However, in this literature, the analysis of the representative role has been providing 
inconsistent results. Indeed, some studies on negotiators’ behavior supported the thesis that 
accountability to constituents affects the competitiveness of representatives’ behaviors (Folmer et 
al. 2012; Blake and Mouton 1961; Druckman, Solomon, and Zechmeister 1972; Benton and 
Druckman 1974), whereas other studies display the opposite effect demonstrating that 
representatives feel freer to compromise (Haccoun and Klimoski 1975) or, finally, that 
accountability to a constituency leads to more flexible attitudes (Enzle, Harvey, and Wright 1992). 
The inconsistency of the findings can be explained by the presence of situational and 
contextual characteristics that may affect compromising behaviors in negotiation (Druckman 1994). 
In his meta-analysis on the determinants of compromising behaviors in negotiations, Druckman 
(1994) discusses a number of situational variables that can interact with the effect of being a 
representative on individuals’ behaviors. These moderating factors are variables such as the 
visibility of the negotiation, the time pressure, the opponent’s strategy, the opportunity to organize a 
strategy before the negotiation (Druckman 1994) or again the representative’s selection method 
(Haccoun and Klimoski 1975),  the level of accountability (Klimoski and Ash 1974), the level of in-
group cohesiveness (Klimoski 1972) or the representative’s position within the group (Steinel et al. 
2010). Thus, in order to understand the real effect that the representative role has, researchers 
should consider the influence of these moderators and try to rule them out.  
On the other hand, the second strand of the literature focuses more on the effect that the 
representative role has on general individuals’ behaviors. A study by Charness and Jackson (2009) 
demonstrates that representatives display less risky behaviors then individuals. Song (2008) shows 
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that group representatives trust less and reciprocate less. Further studies show that representatives 
exhibit less other-regarding behaviors or less cooperative behaviors than individuals behaving just 
on their own behalf (Song, Cadsby, and Morris 2004; Diekmann 1997; Humphrey and Renner 
2011). Finally some scholars show that there is a gender difference in the effect of representation on 
individuals’ cooperation (Hauge and Røgeberg 2014). These studies investigate the effect that being 
representatives has on individuals’ cooperative behaviors in classical experimental settings such as 
the public good game, the prisoner’s dilemma or the dictator game.  
Of these experimental settings, the dictator game appears particularly suitable as an answer to 
the problematic of situational moderators in negotiation studies, given that its simplicity removes 
representatives’ strategic motivations (Song, Cadsby, and Morris 2004, 341). This allows the 
consideration of individuals’ behaviors towards others (individuals’ intentions) independently from 
the interaction situation (i.e. ruling out possible confounders presented in negotiation and 
interaction settings). 
Ultimately, this thesis wants to contribute to the existent literature, by considering both 
perspectives and suggesting a new approach aimed at overcoming the methodological problems 
encountered. Hence, the next chapter will explain how the thesis is intended to contribute to this 
literature.  
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3 Research Focus 
Following Demoulin and De Dreu’s plea to integrate research on interpersonal negotiation with the 
study of intergroup relations (2010), my aim is to consider the existing studies and focus on the 
methodological shortcoming I detected. The existence of this methodological shortcoming does not 
allow the isolation of the causal effect of the representative role as well as its influences; therefore, 
the results obtained from previous studies could be biased. To my knowledge there is no study that 
clearly and explicitly tries to disentangle the effect of being a representative from that of in-group 
favoritism. The differentiation between the two effects is important in order to be able to assert that 
the role of the representative has an influence on individuals’ behavior. As Trötschel, Hüffmeier, 
and Loschelder (2010) demonstrated, the situational salience of intergroup characteristics suffices 
to increase the negotiators’ competitiveness and has a detrimental effect on negotiation. 
Furthermore, other studies on intergroup relations show an increase in discriminatory behaviors in 
comparison to interpersonal relations (for a review see Everett, Faber, and Crockett 2015). Thus, 
there is the danger that the effect of being a representative is confused with identity-based 
intergroup effects making previous studies overestimate the real representation effect. Indeed, the 
common procedure in the literature is to compare individuals’ behaviors in interpersonal situations 
with representatives’ behaviors in intergroup situations2. However, this comparison does not detach 
representation effects from intergroup bias effects. On the contrary, in order to understand the real 
effect of representation on individuals’ behavior, the comparison should include a situation of 
intergroup interaction between group members that are not representing their groups, but just 
themselves.  
The studies most closely related to my criticism are Song, Cadsby and Morris' (2004) and 
Diekmann’s (1997). Song, Cadsby and Morris (2004) conducted a dictator game in order to 
compare the other-regarding behaviors of females and males acting as individuals and as 
representatives. To compare individuals’ and representatives’ behaviors, the authors chose the 
following experimental design: before conducting the actual dictator game in both the individual 
and the representative conditions, the subjects participated in a group affinity task while being 
divided into pairs (i.e. three short riddles and a multiple-choice reading comprehension question). 
The aim of this group affinity task was to create a sense of group familiarity (Song, Cadsby, and 
Morris 2004) useful to frame an intergroup context. However, the experiment was designed in a 
way that made intergroup characteristics salient in the representative condition, whereas in the 
																																																								
2 With ‘interpersonal situations’ is meant an interaction between two individuals where no group characteristics are 
salient. While intergroup situations between representatives considers an interaction between two representatives of two 
different groups. In this case group characteristics are inevitably salient. 
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individual condition these characteristics were not salient. Thus, the procedure applied in Song, 
Cadsby and Morris’ study (2004) does not allow for the detachment of in-group favoritism and 
representative effects.  
The other study conducted by Diekmann (1997) compares individuals’ and representatives’ 
allocation of resources in a competitive set up. The experimental design was constructed in two 
parts: in the first part, subjects competed in a production task either individually (for the individual 
condition) or in groups (for the representative condition); in the subsequent part, subjects 
participated in the dictator game either individually or as representatives (Diekmann 1997). 
However, in this experimental situation, the contextual feature of competition is not enough to 
make intergroup characteristics salient for singular individuals. Indeed, comparing individuals’ 
behaviors in competition and representatives of groups in competitions does not rule out the 
possibility that the actual differences in behaviors are only due to the in-group favoritism effect. 
Thus, to my knowledge there is no previous research that systematically investigates the real 
causal relation between the representative role and individuals’ cooperation level. As previously 
discussed, in order to avoid the moderator effects of situational variables present in interaction 
settings, I analyze the effect of the representative role on individuals’ cooperation conducting a 
dictator game comparing three conditions: a situation of interpersonal interaction between two 
individuals, one with an intergroup interaction between two members of different groups and a final 
situation of intergroup interaction between two representatives. The significance of this study, then, 
lies on its aim to clarify and elucidate the phenomenon related to being a representative and its 
causal relationship with individuals’ cooperative behaviors. 
In addition to the differentiation between in-group favoritism and representative effects, it 
will also be theoretically distinguished between two mechanisms that can explain how the role of 
representative influences individuals’ cooperative behaviors. The first mechanism is related to 
representatives’ accountability towards their in-group members (Folmer et al. 2012), whereas the 
second is based on the implicit justification of discrimination that allows the representative role 
(Diekmann 1997). It will be tested how the two mechanisms are related with the representative role 
by collecting self-reported data through the dictator game. 
To sum up, the present research’s aim is twofold: (1) to investigate the effect that being a 
representative has on individuals’ cooperative behavior by detaching it from identity-based 
intergroup effects and (2) to investigate which mechanism lies behind the effect that the 
representative role has on individuals’ cooperation.  
The following section will present theoretical argumentations asserting a difference between 
in-group favoritism effects and representative effects and display a decrease in cooperation for the 
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4 Theoretical Framework 
In order to differentiate the effect of representation from identity-based intergroup effects, the first 
thing to do is to understand how an intergroup context affects individuals’ behaviors and creates the 
mechanism of in-group favoritism. Subsequently, I will theoretically explain how being a 
representative influences individuals’ behavior. Two different mechanisms that can account for the 
representative effect will be suggested. Finally, in order to distinguish between the two mechanisms 
they will be compared in relation to representatives’ fairness towards their in-group members. 
4.1 Social Identity Theory 
Since representative interactions are a particular case of intergroup relations, in this section the 
theoretical mechanisms of intergroup bias following the social identity theory will be elucidated. 
Intergroup bias is the phenomenon through which members of the same group (in-group) are 
favored over members of other groups (out-groups) (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002). The 
existing social psychology literature recognizes some explanatory mechanisms for the emergence of 
intergroup bias (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002). Of these theories, one of the most prominent 
ones is the social identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979).  
The primary distinction made by the social identity theory is that between interpersonal and 
intergroup interaction: interpersonal interactions are determined by the personal characteristics of 
the interacting individuals and not by the social groups they belong to; whereas intergroup 
interactions are determined by their role as members of a certain social group (Tajfel and Turner 
1979, 34). According to Tajfel and Turner a social group is defined as:  
“[…] a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some 
emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the 
evaluation of their group and of their membership of it.” (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 40) 
Indeed, in social situations where intergroup characteristics are salient and relevant, 
individuals will perceive their role as group members interacting with an out-group member and 
will behave accordingly (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Thus, the contextual salience of the intergroup 
interaction and individuals’ perception of their membership to a group are important features which 
transform interpersonal relations towards intergroup ones (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 36). 
Furthermore, individuals’ categorization as group members provides them with a social 
identification: being member of a group provides a social identity; it allows for the individuals’ 
orientation and self-definition in relation to others (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 40). Given the 
psychological mechanisms related to the fact that individuals strive to maintain or improve their 
self-esteem and that their social identity affects their self-concept, the basic assumption fostered by 
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the social identity theory is that individuals evaluate positively their in-group in comparison to out-
groups in order to differentiate themselves from others (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 40–41). Intergroup 
discrimination occurs, then, because individuals that identify themselves as members of a group 
need to maintain or increase their social identity by positively differentiating their in-group from a 
relevant out-group. This line of reasoning leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In situations of intergroup relations conducted by two members of different 
groups, subjects are less cooperative towards out-group members than in situations of interpersonal 
relations. 
 
This theoretical explanation is valid for both simple group members and group members with 
special functions such as representatives. In comparison to interpersonal situations, then, it suffices 
to interact with an out-group member to be less cooperative. In the following section I will illustrate 
two theoretical mechanisms, which assume that the representative role further decreases 
cooperation. 
4.2 Representative Role: the Accountability Effect 
Representatives’ interactions are not only contextualized in intergroup relations, they also face the 
pressure of accountability towards the group members they are responsible for. Thus, the 
mechanisms that lay at the basis of the concept of accountability have to be considered.  
As a universal feature of the decisional context, feeling responsible means that individuals are 
held accountable for what they do (Tetlock 1992). Indeed, accountability is a mechanism that 
fosters social and cultural conformity (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Accountability refers to the 
implicitly or explicitly perceived expectation to justify one’s behavior to an audience (Tetlock 
1992). The audience, then, evaluates individuals’ behaviors on the basis of shared social norms and 
prescriptions. These evaluations of behaviors and the attribution of responsibility are based on three 
situational elements of accountability: prescriptions, the specific event and actors’ identities 
(Schlenker et al. 1994). Prescriptions are general rules for conduct such as informal and formal 
social norm, law and codes (Schlenker et al. 1994). Events are the unit of measurement for 
evaluating actors’ behaviors and the consequences of these (Schlenker et al. 1994). Finally, actors’ 
identities refers to the social roles and identities relevant to the situation (Schlenker et al. 1994). 
Accountability is then influenced by the relevance of the three characteristics for the actor and the 
evaluator and is characterized by the strength of the linkages between the three elements as 
perceived by the evaluator of a certain behavior (Schlenker et al. 1994). Indeed, the three 
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characteristics are connected to each other: events are influenced by the prescriptions related to 
them, prescriptions often are linked to roles and social identities and are perceived through them 
and the connection of actors to the event is determined by their identity (Schlenker et al. 1994). The 
clearer the expectation of a certain behavior is – given the linkage between the event, prescriptions 
and actors’ identities – the more individuals are accountable to act accordingly. Thus, accountability 
influences individuals’ actions because being held responsible for an event affects actors’ self-
perception and their social identity (Schlenker et al. 1994). Indeed, the impact of the event on 
individuals’ identity is related to the level of responsibility they have (Schlenker et al. 1994). 
Ascertaining an actor’s responsibility for an event means to recognize that the event will affect the 
audience’s evaluation and, thus, the actor’s identity (Schlenker et al. 1994).  
In the particular case of the representative role, represented individuals will evaluate 
representatives’ behaviors on the basis of their social identity of in-group members and of the 
existence of relevant social norms for the group. As displayed in the previous section, a 
fundamental social norm for intergroup relationships is the in-group favoritism norm. Therefore, 
following this social norm, represented individuals will expect representatives to favor them over 
out-group members. The fact that representatives are accountable for the outcomes of their 
behaviors leads them to consider their identity in relation to the members of their in-group and their 
expectations. In order to maintain a positive social identity, representatives will increasingly follow 
the in-group favoritism norm. Thus, in contrast to intergroup interactions between two group 
members of different groups where the in-group favoritism norm influences individuals’ behavior, 
the accountability representatives experience towards their in-group members leads them to comply 
even more to the in-group favoritism norm and raises their out-group discrimination even more. 
To sum up, the role that representatives have – as accountable for the well-being of in-group 
members – affects their cooperative behavior making them discriminate out-group members. 
Therefore, following this conclusion, the second hypothesis presumes that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In situations of intergroup relations conducted by representatives, subjects are less 
cooperative towards out-group members than in situations of intergroup relations conducted by two 
members of different groups. 
 
Therefore, when considering individuals’ identity in interactions it is important to include the role 
that accountability has on the individual choice of behavior. In situations where individuals’ 
identities are fundamental such as in intergroup studies, the effect that accountability plays towards 
in-groups is a fundamental mechanism that further influences individuals’ behaviors.  
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4.3 Representative Role: the ‘Implicit Justification’ Mechanism 
The literature on dishonesty can provide a contrasting theoretical mechanism in relation to the 
effect that the representative role has on individuals’ behaviors. Following Mazar, Amir and Ariely 
(2008), individuals are likely to undertake dishonest behaviors when they can maintain a positive 
self-concept. In order to maintain their positive self-concept, therefore, individuals try to find 
justifications for their actions (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008). Individuals that have clearly defined 
goals, then, legitimate their actions by constructing rational justification in order to persuade 
themselves and others (Kunda 1990, 482). However, justifications of a certain behavior are 
determined by the possibility to find evidence that favors it (Kunda 1990, 483). Thus, individuals 
engage in dishonest behavior to the extent that they can come up with a justification based on 
possible and reasonable motivations that allows them to maintain a positive self-concept. 
Following the literature on dishonesty, in the context of cooperation, where a social norm of 
equity and prosociality exists (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009), behaviors that do not comply to 
prosocial standards should be justified in order to be perceived as legitimate. It should be noted that 
self-interested motives are not defined here as dishonest, but following the logic provided by the 
previous argument, these behaviors violate a social norm and should be, therefore, justifiable. 
However, studies on fairness display also that there is an egocentric bias in the perception of 
payments allocations (Greenberg 1983). Because of the ambiguity that subsists around the concept 
of fairness, this bias is especially relevant when self-interest and fair motivations are compared 
(Reis 1987). Indeed, in these situations the ambiguity around what is a fair behavior allows multiple 
interpretations of fairness and, therefore, the possibility to justify self-interested actions (Diekmann 
1997, 5). Hence, already in an interpersonal context, individuals’ self-interested behaviors can be 
justified. 
In relation to the representative role, there are empirical evidences that show that individuals 
are more likely to be dishonest pursuing their self-interest when others can benefit from their 
cheating (Gino and Pierce 2009; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2013; Wiltermuth 2011). Particularly, 
analyzing the effect of the representative role on individuals’ choices of resources allocation, 
Diekmann (1997) assumed that behaviors perceived as unfair but that are implicitly justified by 
situational features are more likely to be enacted especially if they favor the self. Indeed, she 
displayed that representatives are less cooperative because they feel justified in their action, given 
that their in-group members will benefit from it. Thus, in comparison to an interpersonal context 
where self-interested behaviors can be justified, enacting the representative role in itself further 
justifies individuals’ decision to unequally distribute resources with an out-group. Specifically, the 
social norm of in-group favoritism justifies representatives’ selfishness because of the consequence 
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that it has on the members of their group. Given the implicit legitimation of caring for in-group 
members, being a representative allows carrying on selfish motivations and increasingly 
discriminate out-group members. 
 
To sum up, the elucidated theoretical mechanism also confirms hypothesis 2. However, in order to 
understand individuals’ motivations, it is important to distinguish between the two competing 
mechanisms. Thus, the aim of the next section is to illustrate what distinguishes the two 
explanations and in what way it is possible to grasp how the representative role influences 
individuals’ behaviors. 
4.4 Accountability or Implicit Justification? 
Both theoretical mechanisms assume a decrease in cooperation (or an increase in out-group 
discrimination) for individuals enacting the role of representatives. However, the two arguments are 
different in regards to the level of importance that representatives direct towards the individuals 
who are dependent on them. While the accountability mechanism assumes that representatives care 
about their in-group members and therefore discriminate the out-group, the implicit justification 
mechanism asserts that the role of representative is used as a means to justify selfish motives.  
Therefore, on the one hand, when following the accountability argument, it is expected that 
the role as in-group member enacted by individuals in intergroup relation becomes even more 
important when the accountability mechanism is added to the situation. The role of the 
representative makes individuals be accountable for people dependent on them and therefore 
increases the relevance of the implicit in-group favoritism norm. In these situations, not only do 
subjects want to differentiate themselves from the out-group members, but they also want to fulfill 
their in-group expectations about their role in the interaction and protect their social identity. 
Consequently, representatives are motivated to be fair towards their in-group members. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Representatives feel accountable for their in-group members and therefore will be 
cooperative. 
 
On the other hand, when following the implicit justification argument, it is expected that out-group 
discrimination be based on the role’s contextual justification, which excuses selfishness. Thus, it is 
suggested that because the intergroup context is useful only for legitimating selfish motivations, 
representatives place more relevance towards their personal gain rather than their in-group gain. 
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This line of reasoning assumes that representatives are less cooperative with their in-group 
members. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The representative role implicitly allows the justification of the pursuit of their selfish 
interests; therefore, they will be less cooperative with their in-group members. 
 
This part focused on theoretically disentangling two effects, which were not clearly distinguished in 
previous studies; namely, the effect of being a representative and the in-group favoritism effect. In 
addition to that, two theoretical mechanisms related to the representative role were displayed.  
The theoretical detachment of the effects previously confused calls for a methodological 
reorientation in order to causally determine the actual effect of the representative role on 
individuals’ cooperation. In the following section, it will be shown how this thesis 
methodologically distinguishes itself from the existent literature and how the causal relation 
between the representation effect and individuals’ cooperation will be investigated.  
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5 Methodology 
In this section I will display the structure of the experiment in detail and the research design that I 
judge most suitable to analyze my research questions. Since I decided to carry out an online 
experiment, prior to discussing the experimental design, I will focus on a methodological discussion 
on the relevance of the experimental inquiry for the analysis of causation and the advantages and 
disadvantages of conducting online experiments. Subsequently, the experimental structure will be 
displayed: I will address the economic game and the procedure used to collect the data. Finally, I 
will explain how the variables in the hypotheses and the main control variables have been 
operationalized. 
5.1 Experiments: the Golden Standard for Causal Inference 
The discourse on causation has a long philosophical and empirical history where different 
understandings of how a causal relationship can be defined and how it can be analyzed intertwine 
with each other. However, the counterfactual theoretical framework is one of the most influential 
views on causation. From a counterfactual perspective, a cause C can be defined the cause of an 
outcome O only when, in the absence of C, O will have never occurred. Hence, to ascertain a causal 
relationship between C and O, one needs to verify what happens in the absence of C. Unfortunately, 
comparing the factual with the counterfactual is only philosophically possible since once something 
happens it cannot unhappen. However, the closest thing to a counterfactual proof can be achieved 
through the manipulation of the cause in experimental methods.  
The most suitable method to investigate a causal relationship is the randomized experimental 
design. Randomized experiments are defined as the golden standard for analyzing causal inference 
due to the fact that the random assignment of individuals to the treatment, or the control condition, 
removes the influence of possible unobserved confounders; therefore, it allows for a causal analysis 
close to counterfactuality (Gerber and Green 2012). The problem caused by the unobserved 
confounders – called selection bias – considers the fact that treated individuals would still differ 
from individuals in the control group absent the treatment (Angrist and Pischke 2009).  
Methodologically, this is precisely what the criticism towards previous studies, which was 
highlighted in this thesis, is about; namely, that assigning individuals to the intergroup interaction 
treatment between representatives and comparing them with individuals in interpersonal 
interactions [see arrow (1) in figure 1a] inevitably positions them into an intergroup condition, 
which influences the causal effect solely by the fact of them being representatives. Thus, I suggest 
adding to the comparison a further control group where the salience of intergroup interaction is 
Giorgio Cassina  Methodology 
	 16 
present but where the effect of being a representative is absent (figure 1b, where the groups are 
indicated in colors). This will provide an understanding of the real effect that being a representative 
has on individuals’ cooperation behavior by controlling the influence of an identity-based 
intergroup effect [arrow (3) in figure 1b]. 
Figure 1a shows that the findings of previous causal analysis do not consider the in-group 
favoritism effect related to the construction of an intergroup situation. However, as figure 1b 
displays, the methodological approach proposed in this research does consider the in-group 
favoritism effect. Therefore, I assert that the real effect of the representative role is captured by the 
comparison illustrated with arrow (3) and not the comparison displayed with arrow (1) as prior 
studies suggested. However, it is possible that the comparison shown with arrow (3) does not have 
any effect and that the comparisons of arrow (1) and (2) exhibit the same effect. This would prove 
that previous findings on the representative roles were just due to the in-group favoritism effect.  
Nevertheless, I suppose that there exists a difference between the intergroup condition and the 
intergroup condition between representatives. Thus, applying the method proposed in figure 1b, will 
shed light into the effect of the representative role and it will show whether it exists or whether 






Figure 1a: Previous causal analysis. Figure 1b: New approach to causal 
analysis. 
 
My analysis of the causal relationship between being a representative and individuals’ cooperative 
behaviors is not conducted in the classical experimental setting (i.e. laboratory), but is conducted 
online. Thus, before addressing the experimental design per se, I first have to discuss implications 
connected to this experimental setting, which is increasingly used. This means that I have to discuss 
the software used to program the experiment and the platform in which it is implemented.  
(2) 
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5.2 oTree: A Platform for Online Experiments 
With the increasing establishment of experimental research in economics, psychology and also 
within the social sciences and with the raising importance of digital technologies during the last 
years, the development of an online and versatile experimental software was a matter of time. This 
experimental software presented itself in the guise of oTree, an online and open-source platform for 
field, laboratory and online experiments (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016). oTree provides 
flexibility in that it is independent from any digital devices (it can be run on computer, tablets and 
smartphones) as well as from the major operating systems (Windows, Mac, Android and Linux) and 
it requires only a connection to a server and a browser to conduct the experiment (Chen, Schonger, 
and Wickens 2016). The programming language used in oTree is Python, a common open-source 
language used in science with a solid community of users providing useful solutions (Chen, 
Schonger, and Wickens 2016). Furthermore, oTree itself is open-source and has a scientific 
community of users. 
The possibilities that its features provide to researchers, allows to enhance the external 
validity of experimental studies, which are still mainly conducted in university laboratories with 
Western students. Indeed, online experiments overcome the difficulties of reaching many and 
different subjects. Furthermore, the strength of oTree also lies in the possibility of interacting with 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) a common platform used to conduct online experiments (Chen, 
Schonger, and Wickens 2016).  
The programming versatility and the simple applicability of experiments conducted with the 
oTree platform allowed me to conduct the experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). In the 
following section, this popular platform for online experiments will be presented and its advantages 
and disadvantages will be discussed. 
5.3 Online Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
“Just as television shows are not filmed plays, online experiments are not simply laboratory experiments 
conducted online.” (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011, 401) 
 
Amazon Mechanical Turk started in 2005 as an online crowdsourcing platform that mainly offered 
tasks such as extrapolating information from images or conducting audio transcriptions (Mason and 
Suri 2012). However, the usefulness of the platform for online experiments is documented and 
displayed by several studies (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010; Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 
2011; Mason and Suri 2012). Indeed, conducting experiments on MTurk offers a number of 
advantages in comparison to laboratory experiments. Before discussing the differences between 
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online experiments conducted in platforms such as MTurk and laboratory experiments, let me 
briefly explain how the service works in order to frame the context that these websites offer. 
MTurk practically functions as an online labor market for Human Intelligent Tasks (HITs). 
Users of this platform are categorized as requesters (employers) or as workers (employees). 
Requesters post HITs on MTurk describing generally the topic of the task, how much it is going to 
last and the wage employees will get. On the basis of this information, employees select the HITs 
they are interested to submit to. Both requesters and workers are recognizable by an ID provided by 
Amazon, but their identities are maintained anonymous. Furthermore, tasks are typically simple and 
just few minutes are required to complete them (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). All these 
features define MTurk as a labor market of HITs and are important characteristics to be considered 
when comparing the platform with offline experimental situations.  
Given the structure of MTurk, there are three main practical advantages that makes 
conducting online experiments in this crowdsourcing platform easier: there is a stable and constant 
existing pool of subjects, the costs are low due to the nature of the tasks and the faster process of 
collecting data allows a more effective production of scientific knowledge (Mason and Suri 2012). 
Additionally, this stable and large low paid pool of subjects differs from the common experimental 
subject pool (i.e. students) on different levels. Workers on MTurk come from different backgrounds 
displaying different ethnicities, education levels, languages, nationalities, ages and socio economic 
status (Mason and Suri 2012). Specifically, the majority of workers are from the United States and 
India (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010), there is a slight majority of women and the median 
reported age is 32 years old (this data is based on an investigation made on nearly 3000 workers on 
MTurks by Mason and Suri 2012; the description of the research sample is displayed in chapter 
6.1.1). These demographic characteristics do not make the online subject pool representative of the 
whole population, but increase the external validity of the results by including individuals other 
than students. 
However, despite these advantages, laboratory experiments are still the prevalent tool used for 
behavioral studies. This is due to many reasons including the necessity to apply a physical treatment 
and the researcher’s worries about the validity of online experiments. Indeed, with regard to internal 
validity threats there are some limitations often mentioned in relation to online experiments: the 
non-reliability of participants, the impossibility to create a common knowledge about the 
experiment and subjects’ experience with economic games.  
In online experiments, there is no certainty that the subjects are participating on their own or 
that each subject participates just one time. Although the first problem cannot be solved, multiple 
participations or the use of programs to compile experiments are rarely a problem in MTurk 
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because of the possibilities to track IP addresses and to use browser cookies (Mason and Suri 2012). 
Connected to this problem, there is also the figure of the “spammers”: subjects that without paying 
any attention to HITs instructions try to maximize their gains by doing as many tasks as they can. 
Such a behavior can be expected to be frequent due to the structure of the online labor market 
platform. However, as Mason and Suri (2012) and Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis (2010) 
demonstrated, the amount of workers that consider the platform as a preliminary source of income 
is negligible. The majority of workers consider MTurk as a fruitful way to spend their free time 
(Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). Indeed, most of them spend a day, or less, working on 
MTurk gaining less than $20 per week (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). A final option to 
rule out this problem, lies on the possibility to identify workers and requesters by their MTurk ID 
and, thus, to filter for participants that display undesired features (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 
2011). Thus, findings show that internal validity dangers related to the reliability of participants are 
not as pronounced as expected and that they can be avoided. 
Further issues can be due to the difficulty to supervise subjects and provide them with a 
common knowledge of the experiment. Indeed, it is demonstrated that unsupervised subjects are 
less attentive (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009). Hence, the impossibility of creating a 
common knowledge about the experiment and answer possible inquiries leaves space for individual 
interpretation that can affect the results (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009). To avoid 
these situations in online experiments a possibility could be to include comprehension questions and 
questions controlling individuals’ attention called “catch trials”. However, because my experiment 
encompasses a relatively small and simple task, risks connected to incomprehension should be 
relatively low. 
Another important issue is related to the nonnaïvité of MTurk workers (Chandler, Mueller, 
and Paolacci 2014; Chandler et al. 2015). Indeed, workers remain members of the subject pool 
much longer than classical members of traditional subject pools in laboratory experiments and 
therefore are more likely to participate to similar studies (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2014). 
Furthermore, the existence of websites where workers can share their experience and information 
on tasks could influence results obtained on MTurk (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2014). On the 
one hand, studies show that information exchanges do not offer a real threat because participants 
mainly share instrumental features such as length of the task and payments received (Chandler, 
Mueller, and Paolacci 2014) and are not a frequent phenomenon (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 
2011). On the other hand, the nonnaïve workers are particularly relevant for experiments 
conducting classical and more common used paradigms (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2014). 
The main problem of nonnaïve participants is that the effect sizes are reduced and, therefore, the 
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meaningfulness of the experiment decreases as well (Chandler et al. 2015). Because my design is 
based on three variations of the dictator game, the workers’ nonnaïvité can influence the findings. 
Thus the experience participants have with MTurk (i.e. the number of HITs they have conducted) 
and their particular experience with similar economic games will be controlled. However, this is a 
problem that will be considered in more detail when analyzing the findings. 
All these problems are framed in a condition of labor market where workers receive low 
payments for their participations. However, while the problem related to the nonnaïvité of 
participants is relevant and should be addressed, studies that compare online and laboratory 
experiments display similar results; therefore, stressing the validity of the online alternative 
(Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011; Mason and Suri 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 
2010). 
As with every research design, online experiments present some advantages and 
disadvantages. In my particular case, however, the advantages (most noteworthy the stable and 
large subject pool as well as the low costs) of conducting the experiment online rather than in the 
laboratory exceed the disadvantages (mainly the nonnaïvité of respondents). With these 
considerations in mind, the next section will elucidate the structure of the experiment. 
5.4 Experimental Design 
This section is dedicated to elucidate the experimental design used for my research. Since my main 
criticism on previous studies is based on their methodological shortcomings, in the following I will 
show in detail the structure of the experimental design that – in my opinion – appears to be more 
suitable to investigate the causal relationship between the representative role and individuals’ level 
of cooperation. Thus, I propose that the causal analysis of the phenomenon under consideration 
requires a between subjects design where participants are quasi randomly assigned to one of three 
treatment conditions: (1) interpersonal interaction, (2) intergroup interaction between members of 
different groups or (3) intergroup interaction between representatives of different groups.   
After a description of the method applied to gather the data, the explanation of the game 
paradigm and of the procedure used to frame an intergroup conflict, this section will finish with an 
exposition of the experimental procedure. 
5.4.1 The Strategy Method 
In experimental methods, the standard procedure to obtain data is to conduct experiments where 
subjects are assigned to different conditions and have to carry out a task depending on the role they 
have in the game. This method is also called direct response method. However, one problem 
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connected to this method is that there is the possibility that subjects do not really reflect on their 
decisions and do not consider the strategic interdependence of the game they are playing (Oxoby 
and McLeish 2004).  
Trying to improve the understanding of subjects’ decisions, Selten (1967) developed the 
strategy method. This method consists in making individuals develop a complete strategy for the 
game (i.e. make them plan their own behaviors) (Selten 1967). Individuals have to simultaneously 
decide how they would behave in each possible role and each possible sequential decision in the 
game. In this way, the development of an entire strategy should foster a thorough reflection on 
which strategy to employ (Oxoby and McLeish 2004). However, the contrary is also possible; by 
making individuals reflect about the entire strategy they want to apply, subjects can consider each 
decision differently than if they would have decided subsequently (Roth 1995). Furthermore, the 
fact that decisions are made simultaneously in the strategy method can have an effect on 
individuals’ choices (Roth 1995). Indeed, the strategy method does not grasp temporal sequence of 
decisions in interactions, which can have an effect on individuals’ responses (Roth 1995). Thus, to 
apply either the direct response method or the strategy method on games with a complex structure 
could have a different influence on the results.  
In this particular case, however, I conducted a one-shot dictator game with a simple game 
structure. Therefore, given the simplicity of this experiment the explained disadvantages of the 
strategy method should not influence the results. Indeed, several studies comparing the direct 
response method and the strategy method demonstrated that using one method or the other does not 
affect the results in sequential dictator game decisions (Cason and Mui 1998) nor in ultimatum 
games (Oxoby and McLeish 2004), nor even in public good experiments (Fischbacher, Gächter, and 
Quercia 2012). 
A final advantage related to the application of the strategy method is that it allows me to be 
more efficient in collecting data since each subject provides information about their strategy, not 
only the subjects assigned to the role of the dictator. 
5.4.2 The Dictator Game and the Minimal Group Paradigm 
The dictator game is a widely used paradigm in game theory to investigate actors’ fairness and 
cooperation level. As a simple paradigm, the structure of the dictator game is such that strategic 
behaviors are excluded (Diekmann 2013, 52). Indeed, the game consists in the decision to divide an 
endowment with another person. To one subject (the dictator) an endowment of – normally – 10 
units is given and the subject must consequently decide how much to give to another player that 
knows the rules of the game but can only passively receive the chosen part of the endowment. The 
particularity of this game is that a strictly rational actor behaving as a homo oeconomicus is 
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expected to keep everything for him or herself. However, contrary to this standard economic 
assumption, it has been demonstrated that a significant amount of dictators behave fairly and share 
money with other players (for a meta-analysis see Engel 2011). The fact that some players act as 
purely motivated by self-interest, while others display more prosocial behaviors, makes the dictator 
game a useful tool to investigate how cooperation is established. Indeed, the simple game structure 
and the interesting findings made the dictator game – in its different variations and forms – one of 
the most frequently used games of theoretical paradigms (List 2007).  
In the research field of intergroup relations, the dictator game is often used to understand 
behaviors in intergroup contexts (Everett, Faber, and Crockett 2015). These studies on intergroup 
relations mainly try to display the phenomenon of intergroup bias (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 
2002) by framing individuals into an intergroup context and making them interact with out-group 
members. Thus, in games such as the dictator game, players’ identities as group members become a 
relevant feature of the interaction that influences their behaviors. In this variant of the dictator 
game, the framing procedure is established either by creating a group based on real individuals’ 
characteristics (i.e. nationality, ethnicity, gender, etc.) or by creating minimal groups. Minimal 
groups are established by categorizing individuals into novel groups (Pinter and Greenwald 2011). 
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the mere categorization of individuals in minimal groups is 
sufficient to create intergroup discriminatory behaviors (Tajfel et al. 1971). Through the years of 
minimal group paradigm studies, different alternative procedures have been developed. Some 
procedures use deception to make participants believe that they are categorized in groups that are 
built on the basis of the similarity of responses to previous tasks, other procedures use imagination 
techniques to foster individuals’ perception of an intergroup context, others just explicitly 
randomize participants into groups, while others construct groups by making subjects interact and 
familiarize in a previous task. 
On the basis of Pinter and Greenwald’s comparison of minimal group induction procedures 
(2011), as well as the difficulty to develop real games interaction in online experiments and 
considering the importance to avoid participants’ deception, I concluded that the imagination 
procedure invented by Crisp and Turner (2009) represents a practical method to frame an intergroup 
context. Indeed, the imagination procedure presents an interesting high degree of minimalism 
enough to produce in-group favoritism (Pinter and Greenwald 2011). The reason for that is 
explained by Crisp and Turner (2009, 234) who state that the imagination of intergroup contact 
activates the same cognitive processes involved in real intergroup contacts and fosters therefore the 
same discriminatory behaviors as real situations. Although the imagination technique is widely used 
to investigate the effects that imagined contacts have on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors (Crisp 
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and Turner 2009; Turner and Crisp 2010; Turner, Crisp, and Lambert 2007), Pinter and Greenwald 
(2011) display its usefulness as a procedure to establish minimal groups.  
 
Thus, in this experiment the intergroup contextual framework is based on this imagination 
procedure. In the two intergroup conditions, before the actual game, I show two different paintings 
and make participants choose the one they prefer. Participants are instructed to imagine that half of 
the participants have been categorized in a “red group” and the other half is categorized in a “green 
group” based on their predilection of one of the two paintings. They are further told to imagine 
being part of one of two groups that preferred the same painting (Figure 2 displays the framing 
procedure as it was in the experiment). 
As figure 2 illustrates, the slide that frames participants into different groups does not actually 
present the possibility to choose the painting one likes the most. This level of passiveness can lead 
participants to skip to the following slide without carefully reading the instructions. If this was the 
case, this behavior could compromise the assumed effect of the framing mechanism. To avoid that, 
I decided to hide the “Next” button during the first five seconds of the screening time. In this 
limited amount of time participants must remain on the page, which should consequently guarantee 
their exposure to the intergroup treatment. 
 
 
Figure 2: Minimal group induction procedure used in the experiment 
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5.4.3 Procedure 
The experiment was uploaded as an HIT on Mturk on Tuesday, April 9th 2019. With a single 
session where the HIT was accessible for a period of an hour and forty minutes, a total of 194 
participants were recruited. As table 1 shows, on the description page of the experiment on MTurk, 
participants were informed about the general structure of the HIT (type of task, time necessary, 
anonymity) and that they were going to be paid $0.50 as show-up fee with the possibility of earning 
$1.50 as a bonus payment (as dictators they were endowed with 10 points, each point worth $0.15). 
For workers that actively participated in the whole experiment (a dictator game and a survey) 
without timing out any pages (N = 159), the average earning amounts to $1.24.  
 
Table 1: HIT Description on MTurk 
Purpose of the 
study 
To understand how people make decisions in particular situations. 
 
What you will 
do 
You will complete decision-making tasks and answer survey questions. 
Time required Approx. 5-10 minutes. 




You will receive $0.50 for participating and up to $1.50 as a bonus for 
completing the HIT. 
In case of trouble such as technical difficulties, search for a HIT 
called ETH DeSciL Trouble Ticket. 
 
Since the management of the experiment as an MTurk HIT was entrusted to the Decision Science 
Laboratory (DeSciL) of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, the uploading of it was 
conducted through their employer profile on the platform. Indeed, the experiment was compliant 
with their operational rules and their terms and conditions3. Thus, following the DeSciL procedure, 
participation to the HIT was limited only to US citizens. 
Once workers accept to participate to the HIT, they were directed towards the starting page of 
the experiment, where they have to accept the general conditions before starting the game (the 
general conditions can be found in the ‘Informed Consent Form’ page in appendix 10.1). Once the 
general conditions are accepted, participants are assigned to one of the three treatment conditions 
using a procedure that is not entirely random. The procedure consists in grouping participants in 
																																																								
3 https://www.descil.ethz.ch/lab/researchers 
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groups of four on the basis of their arrival order and then assign these four participants to one of the 
conditions following the cyclical order: interpersonal, intergroup and intergroup between 
representative interaction. This allows both to have enough participants in all conditions and to 
avoid that the interdependency between participants creates coordination problems (i.e. too long 
time gaps). Subchapter 5.1.2 of the results will deal with the randomization procedure and discuss 
its validity. After the treatment assignment, participants start the actual dictator game. 
5.4.4 The Game 
The game consists in a one-shot dictator game that subjects have to submit either as individuals, as 
group members or as the representative of an in-group member. In order to collect data efficiently, 
the strategy method is applied, making each participant enact the role of the dictator. Each of the 
subjects’ decision can affect their payoff and that of the other participants they are interacting with. 
However, the players’ actual payoff is determined by randomly selecting their decision or that of 
one of the players interacting with them. Thus, prior to playing the game, participants were made 
aware that their allocation choice could be selected to determine their own and the other players’ 
payoff. Finally, the dictator game differed in some features depending upon the specific condition, 
which will be outlined below. 
In the interpersonal condition, subjects are told they have to play a dictator game with another 
participant of the survey. In this condition, dictators are given 10 points as endowment that they 
have to allocate between themselves and the other subject, and can be made by means of selecting 
one of the possible options provided (10-0, 9-1, 8-2, 7-3, 6-4, 5-5, 4-6, 3-7, 2-8, 1-9, 0-10; see 
Appendix 10.1.1). The presentation of these options aimed at avoiding uncertainties over the 
payoffs.  
Differently from the interpersonal condition, in the intergroup condition between group 
members, subjects are framed into minimal groups using the imagination procedure previously 
explained and they are told that they are going to play a dictator game with a member of the other 
group – making situational intergroup characteristics salient.  
In the intergroup condition between representatives, additionally to the contextual framing of 
the intergroup situation, participants are also responsible for the outcome of an in-group member. 
Players in the dictator game are paired with another member of their in-group. So participants are 
not only choosing for themselves, but their decision will also influence the payoff of a member of 
their group. Thus, participants’ choices consist on how much of the endowment they want to give to 
the other group and how much they want to keep for their own group. Prior to the game, 
participants will be informed that the amount of money they decide to keep for the group will affect 
both their payoff and the payoff of the in-group member they are representing and it will be divided 
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equally within the group. Furthermore, because the amount of the endowment is divided between 
the two members of both the in-group and the out-group, the allocation choice presented to 
participants in this condition will range from 0 to 20 with an increase of 2 points in order to avoid 
having decimal numbers in the division of money within the group (allocation options: 20-0, 18-2, 
16-4, 14-6, 12-8, 10-10, 8-12, 6-14, 4-16, 2-18, 0-20; see Appendix 10.1.3). Therefore, the possible 
distribution options differ from the other two conditions, but because the amount of points is 
divided within the group, the individual payoff remains the same. 
 
The three situational conditions will allow the discerning of the real effect of representation from 
that of the construction of an intergroup context. Indeed, the comparison between the intergroup 
situation between representatives and the intergroup situation between members of different groups 
will illustrate the authentic effect that representation has on individuals’ cooperative behaviors and 
the legitimation of it. 
5.4.5 The Survey 
After the game, the experiment closes with a final questionnaire where classic demographic 
variables such as education level, income, gender, age, and employment status, as well as further 
confounders useful to control the possible problems of MTurk, such as participants’ previous 
experience with economic games and their memory in participating in similar experiments, will be 
collected. Furthermore, in the representative condition, an additional question will be asked, which 
is intended to discern between implicit justification and accountability mechanisms. In this 
question, participants were asked to imagine interacting with their group mate and choosing how 
much to cooperate with them. Answers to this question will allow to establish which mechanism is 
responsible for the allocation in the intergroup context (whether the accountability or the implicit 
justification). To check for the validity and the success of the intergroup framing procedure and of 
the assignment of the representative role, two further questions aimed at measuring participants’ 
feeling of belonging to their group (both in the intergroup and in the intergroup conditions between 
representatives) and their feeling to represent an in-group member (only in the intergroup condition 
between representatives) will be added. 
5.5 Hypotheses and Operationalization of Variables 
The following section will illustrate the fundamental variables used to investigate the causal 
relationships assumed by the developed hypotheses (table 2 provides a summary of the hypotheses). 
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In other words, this chapter will display how the variables collected both during the game and in the 
questionnaire have been operationalized and measured. 
 
Table 2: Summary of the hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 In situations of intergroup relations conducted by two members of 
different groups, subjects are less cooperative towards out-group members 
than in situations of interpersonal relations. 
Hypothesis 2 In situations of intergroup relations conducted by representatives, subjects 
are less cooperative towards out-group members than in situations of 
intergroup relations conducted by two members of different groups. 
Hypothesis 3 Representatives feel accountable for their in-group members and therefore 
will be cooperative. 
Hypothesis 4 The representative role implicitly allows the justification of the pursuit of 
their selfish interests; therefore, they will be less cooperative with their in-
group members. 
 
Treatments. As already explained, the experiment was built in order to discern between in-
group favoritism effect and effects related to the representative role. In order to accomplish such 
goal, three experimental treatment conditions were created. These conditions, however, are the 
results of the two effects: an interpersonal/intergroup treatment and a representative/non-
representative treatment. When assuming an in-group favoritism effect, the first hypothesis deals 
with the first treatment; namely, the comparison of interpersonal and intergroup situations. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the criticisms highlighted in this paper, in order to investigate the real 
effect of being a representative, the second hypothesis considers the second treatment; hence, it 
evaluates the comparison of the intergroup interaction between members of different groups with 
the intergroup interaction between representatives. 
Validity Checks. In order to check whether the treatments worked as intended, two treatment 
validity checks were also conducted; namely, two Likert scales were implemented in the 
questionnaire. The intergroup treatment  – both the intergroup condition and the intergroup 
condition between representatives – was controlled by constructing a five-points Likert scale that 
ranges from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’ and gathers data on the participants’ imagined 
feeling of belonging to a group. Furthermore, the validity check for the representative treatment was 
constructed using the same five-points Likert scale, but it measured the participants’ feelings in 
regards to their ability to influence their group mate’s payoff. This question was only asked to 
participants in the representative condition. 
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Cooperation. The dependent variable is the individual’s cooperation level measured in the 
experiment through the allocations of points to themselves or to their group, which was made by 
participants in the dictator game in the three experimental conditions. Thus, the more points 
individuals allocate to themselves or their own group, the less they are considered to be cooperative. 
The cooperation variable is, therefore, operationalized as a quasi-metrical variable based on 
participants’ distribution choices.  
Since in the intergroup condition between representatives the allocation options in the dictator 
game ranges from 0 to 20 (because the points are divided between the representative and the 
represented in-group member), for the analysis of the results the amount of points participants 
decided to keep for their group is halved in order to be able to consider the individual amount of 
points each group member received. This is done in order to compare the allocation distribution 
between the three conditions.  
Representation mechanisms. Manipulating experimentally the two theoretical mechanisms 
would have required more temporal and monetary resources; moreover, because I aimed at a simple 
game structure, I opted to collect data on the two mechanisms through self-reported data. Other 
possibilities could have been to add a treatment where participants could choose how to distribute 
the payoff within their pair or to add a subsequent part in the experiment where individuals could 
choose how to allocate the money they kept within their pair. However, because the implementation 
of further treatments would have been too expensive and because I wanted to avoid the deception of 
participants, I decided to collect information about the two mechanisms through a question at the 
end of the dictator game. Nevertheless, I am aware of problems related to self-reported data such as 
social desirability bias or other unintentional biases and that actual behaviors and self-reported data 
can differ. 
I asked individuals in the representative condition how many points they would have kept for 
themselves if they had had the possibility to choose how to divide the points they decided to keep 
for their pair between themselves and their in-group member. Hypothesis 3 assumes that, because 
representatives are accountable for their in-group member, they will cooperate and decide for a fair 
distribution of money within the group. On the contrary, hypothesis 4 expects that the 
representative role justifies the pursuit of self-interests and, therefore, representatives do not really 
care about the opinions of their in-group member and will not cooperate with him or her. Thus, I 
expect that participants’ assertions of a fair distribution of money within the group will support the 
accountability mechanism whereas non-cooperative distribution statements will support the implicit 
justification explanation. This hypothetical allocation within the pair is considered theoretically as a 
metrical variable that ranges from 0 to 20 points. However, participants’ decision is limited to their 
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previous choice in the dictator game: the amount of money they can keep for themselves ranges 
from 0 to the amount of points they kept in the dictator game. Thus, the variable is further 
operationalized as the percentage of points kept in the dictator game, which they would have kept 
for themselves within their couple. 
Demographic variables. As classical control variable I collected data on participants’ 
gender, education level, age, income, employment status and I asked them whether English was 
their native language. Variables on participants’ gender and native language are operationalized as 
dummy variables, the education level is coded as an ordinal variable based on the education system 
in the United States, the employment status is categorized as a nominal variable where multiple 
choices are possible, while age and income are continuous variables and income is considered as 
the total annual household income before taxes (see Appendix 10.1). These variables are collected 
both to control the composition of the sample and to verify the effectiveness of the randomization 
process. 
Nonnaïvité. To address one of the main drawbacks of MTurk, I also controlled the nonnaïvité 
of participants by asking them (1) about their experience on MTurk and (2) about their particular 
experience of similar experiments. Participants’ general experience on MTurk is operationalized as 
metrical variable that measures the number of scientific studies (surveys and experiments) they 
attended to, while their exposure to a similar money distribution task, such as the dictator game, 
was measured with a yes or no question, constructing a dichotomous variable. 
Timeouts. It is well known that subjects in online experiments are not participating while 
being in a neutral environment such as the laboratory, but they are at home or in places where they 
are exposed to distractions. Hence, because of the interdependencies created through the use of the 
strategy method and because conducting real interaction online entails the physical presence of 
different participants in front of the computer screen, I had to create a variable that avoided 
participants to get blocked in the experiment in order to wait for other participants to make their 
own decisions. Indeed, all the screens relative to the dictator game – from the instructions to the 
actual allocation decision – display a timer indicating the time participants have to read and if 
necessary fill out the page. The timer is set to 90 seconds and once it reaches the limit, the screen 
page submits itself continuing the experiment. The screen pages with the timer are the general 
introduction, the instructions, the intergroup framing procedure page and the page where 
participants have to allocate the points they receive (see appendix 10.1). For all these pages, I 
created a timeout variable that indicates whether the page is submitted because the time available 
runs out or not. To avoid that participants take advantage of the timer and let the experiment run 
itself to get money without doing anything, I decided not to inform them about the presence of a 
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time limit for the dictator game. Finally, if the allocation page timeouts, the allocation choice is set 
at the equal distribution of points. This is done in order to give an opportunity to participants paired 
with subjects that timeout the allocation page to get some money. Indeed, allocations set by 
timeouts will still be part of the randomization process that determines participants’ payoff.  
To sum up, these timeouts variables have two functions: they avoid losing information of 
participants dependent on other distracted subjects and they give the opportunity during the analysis 
to rule out participants that did not see the introduction, the instructions, the framing screen or 
participants that timeout during the choice and, therefore, did not choose how to allocate the points 
in the dictator game.  
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6 Results 
This chapter is divided into two main parts: the first section will describe the sample, discuss the 
randomization procedure and analyze the validity of the treatments; whereas the second section will 
address the statistical analysis and consider each hypothesis individually.  
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
6.1.1 MTurk Sample 
The sample consists of 194 subjects that accepted the general conditions of the experiment and did 
not decide to withdraw at a certain point. From this initial sample, all the participants who made the 
timer run out in one of the pages were excluded, consequently reducing the sample to 165 
observations. This conservative exclusion was aimed at avoiding any kind of possible error. Indeed, 
although in some cases participants made only the introductory or informatory pages expire and had 
actively allocate the money, it still subsisted the danger that they did not understand the rule of the 
game or that they were not exposed to the treatment. Furthermore, participants that left the 
experiment after the completion of the dictator game without completing the subsequent survey 
were also excluded, subsequently slightly decreasing the final sample once again (N = 159).  
The final sample consists of 38% females and 89% English native speakers. Of the 
participants, 63% were already experienced with similar games; the median of the number of 
participation in scientific studies on MTurk is 1000 with the first quartile at 95 and the third at 6250 
(only 9 subjects never had previous experience with Mturk, while the subject who participated to 
most studies attended 100'000 HITs). The median age of participants is 33 with the first quartile at 
29 and the third one at 40. In respect to the education level, 12% asserted that their highest 
education attainment was a high school diploma, 23% indicated that they attended a college without 
a degree, 17% have an associate’s degree, 42% have a Bachelor degree and 6% have a graduate 
degree (Master or Ph.D.).  In the sample, 25% of the participants have an annual household income 
between $50'000 and 74'999 and the median of participants’ annual household income lies between 
$40'000 and 49'999 with the first quartile between $20'000 and 29'999 and the third quartile that lies 
between $50'000 and 74’999. Finally, 68% of the respondents claimed to be full-time employees 
working 30 hours or more a week, 13% were self-employed and the remaining 19% is shared 
between the other categories (6% part-time employee, 2% students, 4% were out of work, 4% 
homemakers, 3% were retired or permanently disabled)4. 
																																																								
4 Note that the overlapping of categories is possible.	
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This description of the sample already provides some interesting information. Indeed, the 
amount of participants working as full-time employees or are self-employed and the structure of the 
variable annual household income confirms the expectations that MTurk is not the participants’ 
primary source of income. In the next section, the success of the randomization process of the 
experimental treatment will be elucidated and discussed. 
6.1.2 Experimental Randomization 
As explained in section 4.4.3, in order to have enough participants for each condition (interpersonal, 
intergroup and intergroup between representatives) and because of the interdependencies between 
the participants to the experiment, participants were assigned to the treatment conditions in groups 
of four. Once four participants accepted the general conditions of the experiment, they were 
assigned to a treatment: the first group of four participants was assigned to the interpersonal 
condition, the second group to the intergroup condition and the third group to the intergroup 
condition between representatives, the forth again was in the interpersonal condition and so on. This 
assignment method was favored instead of the complete randomization in order to reach a balanced 
participation in all the three conditions. Indeed, table 3 displays the equal distribution of 
participants between the three treatment conditions.  
 
Table 3: Participants’ distribution between treatment conditions 
Interpersonal Intergroup Intergroup between 
representatives 
Total 
54 51 54 159 
 
To control the effectiveness of the applied randomization method, an analysis of the relationship 
between the treatment conditions and the variables collected in the post-experimental survey was 
conducted. Since a perfect randomization procedure should be reflected in a randomized 
distribution of subjects into the experimental conditions, it was expected that the collected control 
variables should not depend from the treatment conditions. In line with these expectations, I found 
no significant relations between the treatment conditions and the collected variables (appendix 10.2 
provides supplementary information about the analysis). As table 4 displays, the only exception 
regards participants’ distribution in the treatments on the basis of their gender. Indeed, a pairwise 
comparison between the treatment conditions shows a significant higher amount of female subjects 
in the interpersonal condition in comparison to the intergroup (two-sided Fisher exact test, p < 0.01) 
and a slightly significant higher amount of women in the interpersonal condition in comparison to 
the intergroup condition between representatives (two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.052). 
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Table 4: Participants’ distribution between the treatments on the basis of 
their gender 
 Interpersonal Intergroup Representatives 
Female 29 13 18 
Male 25 38 36 
 
This overrepresentation of female participants in the interpersonal condition cannot be explained 
neither by the treatment assignment, nor by a gender specific bias related to subjects’ booking time 
of the HIT. First, there is no specific reason why female participants should have started the 
experiment following a specific arrival order pattern in order to mainly fall into one condition. 
Second, the analysis of variance conducted does not show any relation between individuals’ arrival 
time to the experiment (i.e. the time ranking in the experiment of the four-participants group) and 
their gender (Eta squared of 0.0029). Although the relationship between gender and treatment will 
be considered in the following statistical analysis, it can be attributed to a fortuitous case. 
Finally, to further check the validity of the randomization process, we controlled the relation 
between the treatment conditions and participants’ arrival time. The Eta squared value of 0.0028 
confirms that individuals’ arrival time is not related to their assignment to the treatment. Therefore, 
the assignment of the treatment conditions worked as expected. 
6.1.3 Treatment Validity Checks 
Before starting the statistical analysis of the collected data, it is worth looking at the effectiveness of 
the treatments. Indeed, as a measure of controlling the success of the two treatments, we 
constructed two validity checks in the form of Likert scales in the survey. These scales are aimed at 
understanding (1) whether participants felt they belonged to the group they placed – both the 
intergroup and intergroup condition between representatives – and (2) whether participants in the 
intergroup condition between representatives felt they were influencing their group mate’s payoff. 
Since the two treatments mainly aimed at influencing the context in which individuals behave, the 
effects of the treatments were dependent on participants’ interpretations of the different 
experimental situations. Thus, in order to understand whether the different experimental situations 
were actually experienced differently – i.e. whether the treatments successfully influenced 
individuals’ perception of the situation – the two Likert scales investigate aspects that are strictly 
connected to individuals’ interpretation and feeling in regards to the situations they underwent. 
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As displayed in chapter 4.4.2, the intergroup context was established using the imagination 
procedure to create minimal groups. The data from the Likert scale testing the effectiveness of the 
intergroup treatment demonstrates that the treatment was not very successful (figure 3 shows the 
distribution of answers to the Likert scale). Indeed, 44 out of 105 participants (42%) under the 
intergroup treatment – in the intergroup or the intergroup condition between representatives – did 
not agree that they felt to belong to the group they were part of, 24 out of 105 participants (23%) 
remained neutral, while 37 out of 105 subjects (35%) gave a positive answer. As figure 3 shows, the 
high variance of answers in the negative side of the scale and the small amount of participants that 
strongly agree with the scale statement indicates that the construction of an intergroup context may 
have not worked as expected – at least for the majority of the respondents. 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of the level of agreement about the          Figure 4. Distribution of the level of agreement 
  feeling of belonging to the group (N=105).             about the feeling of influencing the  
      group mate's payoff (N=54). 
 
On the contrary, the representative treatment appeared to be effective. Figure 4 shows a much more 
positively skewed distribution of answers to the Likert scale on participants’ feeling to influence the 
group mate’s payoff. Indeed, of the respondents in the intergroup condition between 
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be influencing their group mate’s payoff. On the negative side of the scale, a total of 6 respondents 
out of 54 (11%) did not feel that they influenced their group mate’s payoff, while 11 subjects out of 
54 (20%) gave a neutral answer. Since the majority of participants felt responsible for their in-group 
mate, the representative treatment succeeded in establishing a feeling of representativeness in 
participants. 
Since the representative treatment seemed to be a more successful treatment than the 
establishment of an intergroup context and since the representative role is intrinsically related to the 
presence of intergroup relations, we compared participants’ feeling of belonging to the group in the 
intergroup condition between group members and in the intergroup condition between 
representatives (Table 5 illustrates the comparison). The distribution of answers between the two 
conditions appears to be similar. This is also confirmed by the result of a two-sided Fisher exact test 
(p = 0.80) that does not display any significant difference on individuals’ feeling of belonging to 
their group between the two conditions. Hence, the perception of an intergroup context seems to not 
be influenced by the assignment of the representative role and its consequent feeling of 
responsibility towards an in-group member.  
 




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total 
Intergroup 10 11 14 14 2 51 
Representatives 12 11 10 17 4 54 
 
Since the understanding of the success of a treatment implementation is fundamental for every kind 
of experimental analysis, the findings presented in this section will be useful to understand the next 
section. By presenting the experimental findings, the following chapter will be focused on causally 
disentangling the representative role and in-group favoritism effects of individuals’ cooperation 
level.   
6.2 Statistical Analysis 
6.2.1 The In-group Favoritism Effect  
The analysis of the in-group favoritism effect is conducted by comparing the amount of endowment 
participants decided to keep for themselves in the experiment in the interpersonal and the intergroup 
condition. Figure 5 displays the comparison of the distribution of points ‘allocated to self’ in both 
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conditions. As expected, participants in the intergroup conditions display less cooperative behaviors 
than participants in the interpersonal condition. This is mostly visible when looking at the 
comparison between individuals’ choices to equally divide the endowment and those of subjects’ 
choosing to keep everything for themselves. Indeed, the percentage of participants equally dividing 
the endowment drops from 50% (in the interpersonal condition) to 35% (in the intergroup 
condition), while the percentage of people behaving in a thoroughly self-interested manner rises 
from 35% (in the interpersonal condition) to 47% (in the intergroup condition). Indeed, if the 
average points of the ‘allocation to self’ are compared, in the interpersonal condition the average 
points participants decided to keep amounts to 7, while in the intergroup condition the average 
slightly increases to 7.5. 
Despite the results showing a decrease in cooperation (i.e. an increase in discrimination), the 
comparison between the amount of endowment participants decided to keep for themselves in the 
experiment in the interpersonal and the intergroup condition does not show a significant difference 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.22). Thus, the results found in relation to the in-group favoritism 
effect do not support our hypothesis. 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of allocation to self: a comparison between the interpersonal and the intergroup condition. 
 
To sum up, although the results show a slight decrease in cooperation in the intergroup condition in 
comparison to the interpersonal condition, the findings collected do not support the existence of an 
in-group favoritism effect for groups constructed following the imagination procedure applied in 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10














Giorgio Cassina  Results 
	 37 
the experiment. Thus, the intergroup context created in the experiment did not significantly 
decrease individuals’ cooperation level and discrimination. 
6.2.2 The Representative Role 
The comparison of the distribution of allocated points in the intergroup and the intergroup condition 
between representatives shows that there is a small decrease in cooperation between the two 
conditions5. Figure 6 displays that the percentage of people that shared the endowment equally with 
out-group members is of just 9% lower (from 35% in the intergroup condition to 26% in the 
intergroup condition between representative) and the percentage of participants keeping the whole 
endowment for themselves, their group respectively, increases from 47% to 50% between the 
conditions. In comparison to the intergroup condition, the representative treatment increases the 
average of points allocated to self or each group member from 7.5 to 8. 
Similarly to the previous comparison, the small decrease of cooperation does not show a significant 
difference in the allocation distribution between the intergroup and the intergroup condition 
between representative (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.54). This indicates that the results do not 





5 It should be noted that participants playing the dicator game in the intergroup condition between representatives 
decided the allocation of points for their group. The amount of points were then divided equally within the two 
members of the group. Hence, for the sake of comparison, in the analysis, the distribution of allocated points in the 
intergroup conditions between representatives is considered as the points received by each individual member of the 
group rather than the overall group score. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of allocation to self/each group member: a comparison between the intergroup and the intergroup 
condition between representatives (for comparability, the points represented in the figure for the intergroup condition 
between representatives do not represent the group allocation, but they are considered as the points each member of the 
group receives). 
 
A supplementary analysis aimed at testing hypotheses 1 and 2 was conducted filtering for 
participants that did not feel to belong to the group they were assigned to, keeping only subjects that 
were neutral, that agreed or that strongly agreed to belong to the group (N = 115). The aim was to 
increase the validity of the intergroup interaction treatment and to analyze more reliable results. The 
additional analysis, however, did not display any significant differences from the results presented  
(see Appendix 9.3 for the detailed results). 
6.2.3 A Comparison Between the Three Conditions 
Since neither the intergroup treatment, nor the representative treatment seem to significantly 
influence participants’ cooperation level, looking at the effect of the interaction of the two 
treatments can provide more insights into the phenomenon. The interaction of the two treatments is 
analyzed by comparing the intergroup condition between representatives with the interpersonal 
condition. This is the approach used in previous studies to investigate the effect of the 
representative role (Diekmann 1997; Song, Cadsby, and Morris 2004; Humphrey and Renner 2011; 
Hauge and Røgeberg 2014). However, as explained previously, this comparison does not 
disentangle the effect of the representative role from the in-group favoritism effect.  
The comparison of the distributions of allocated points to self or to each group member 
between the interpersonal and the intergroup condition between representatives reveals a significant 
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difference between the distributions (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.05). Thus, being a 
representative of a group mate and interacting in an intergroup context with out-group members 
significantly decreases individuals’ level of cooperation. This is also visible in the comparison of 
the distribution of the allocated points to self or to each group member in all the experimental 
conditions displayed in figure 7. Indeed, figure 7 shows that the distribution of allocated points to 
each group member in the intergroup condition between representatives is further shifted towards 
less cooperative allocations in comparison to the distribution of points to self in the interpersonal 
and the intergroup conditions. 
 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of allocation to self/each group member: a comparison between the three conditions (for 
comparability, the points represented in the figure for the intergroup condition between representatives do not represent 
the group allocation, but they are considered as the points each member of the group receives). 
 
A further comparison can be made by looking at the difference between the average and median 
points allocated to self or to each group member in the three conditions (see figure 8). While the 
mean points participants’ decided to allocate to self or to each group member slightly increases 
between conditions, the median – as a less sensible measure to extreme values – describes a 
different picture. Indeed, where in the interpersonal condition 50% of participants decided to keep 
half of the endowment for themselves, in the intergroup condition the median increases to eight 
points allocated to self, while in the intergroup condition between representative half of the 
participants kept the whole endowment for the group (group members median points = 9.5). 
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Although the developed hypotheses are not supported by the data, the significant decreases in 
cooperation in the intergroup condition between representatives in comparison to the interpersonal 
condition displayed by the Wilcoxon test is also visible in the strong increase of the median 
allocation to self or each group member. 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean and median comparison between treatment conditions (for comparability, the mean and median points 
represented in the figure for the intergroup condition between representatives do not represent the mean or median 
group allocation, but they are considered as the median or mean points each member of the group receives). 
 
To control the robustness of the findings, an additional analysis of the results was conducted 
through the comparison of different models explaining participants’ cooperative level. Since the 
quasi-metric variable used in the previous analysis based on the points allocated to the self or to 
each member of the group in the dictator game is characterized by a bimodal distribution, I decided 
to recode the variable into a dichotomous variable. Splitting participants using the median, 
individuals were categorized into ‘more cooperative’ and ‘less cooperative’. Three different logistic 
models were then compared to check how robust the interaction between the representative role and 
the in-group favoritism effect was (see table 6). As the three models display, the causal relation 
between the interaction effects and the dichotomized individuals’ cooperative behaviors is 
consistent, also when controlling the collected confounders. 
Model 1 displays the correlation between the treatment conditions and participants’ 
cooperation. The model shows that only the effect of the interaction between the construction of an 
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can be seen that individuals in the intergroup between representatives condition are more likely to 
allocate more to themselves and their group mate in comparison to participants’ allocation to the 
self in the interpersonal condition.  
Since the gender variable is in part related to the randomization process, in model 2 the 
relationship between the treatment conditions and the dependent variable is controlled in 
participants’ gender. As table 6 shows, gender does not have an effect on participants’ cooperation 
level. Furthermore, the interaction of both an intergroup interaction and the representative role still 
significantly affects the likelihood of being less cooperative. Thus, the participants’ gender does not 
affect the influence that the intergroup between representatives condition has on individuals’ 
cooperation level in comparison to the interpersonal condition. 
Finally, model 3 controls all the confounders collected in the post-experimental survey as well 
as the participants’ arrival time to the treatment assignment (i.e. the order of the four-participants 
groups assigned to the treatments). The model displays that in addition to the interaction effect that 
still remained significant, also previous similar experiences with economic games had a highly 
significant effect on participants’ cooperation level. Indeed, participants with similar experience are 
more likely to be less cooperative than participants without any previous experience.  
Ultimately, the findings can be considered to be robust also when controlling for the control 
variable collected in the survey. Thus, this final comparison displays the validity of the causal 
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Table 6: Logistic Regression explaining participants’ cooperation level in the dictator game 
 Cooperation level  
(Reference: more cooperative) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




























Age - - -0.00 
(0.02) 
Income - - 0.12 
(0.09) 
Education: College, no degree  
  (Reference: high school diploma) 
- - 0.78 
(0.70) 
Education: Associate’s degree  
  (Reference: high school diploma) 
- - 0.05 
(0.72) 
Education: Bachelor’s degree  
  (Reference: high school diploma) 
- - 0.62 
(0.63) 
Education: Graduate’s degree (MA, Ph.D.)  
  (Reference: high school diploma) 
- - 1.02 
(0.94) 
MTurk Experience - - 0.00 
(0.00) 
Similar Experience  
  (Dummy, yes=1) 
- - 1.17 ** 
(0.40) 
Arrival time - - -0.02 
(0.01) 
Observations 158 158 158 
AIC 220.87 222.18 230.15 
BIC 230.06 234.43 291.40 
Log Likelihood -107.44 -107.09 -95.08 
Deviance 214.87 214.18 190.15 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. In the table employment status dummies are omitted.  
˚ p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001. 
 
6.2.4 Accountability vs. Implicit Justification 
Although the effect of being a representative alone does not display any significant results, the fact 
that the interaction between the effect of the representative role and the in-group favoritism effect 
has an influence on individuals’ cooperation level makes the analysis of the mechanism at the basis 
of representation relevant. In order to fully understand the interaction effect, the mechanisms behind 
each interaction term should be clearly addressed. In this section, therefore, the two competing 
hypotheses derived from the theoretically assumed mechanisms of accountability and implicit 
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justification will be tested against each other. To test these assumptions, the data used regarding the 
intergroup allocated points are based on self-reported information collected in the post-experimental 
survey. As figure 9 demonstrates, the results mostly support the accountability mechanism. Indeed, 
54% of participants in the intergroup condition between representatives assert that they would have 
equally divided the points with their group mate. Thus, representatives seem to care about the 
payoff of their group mate. 
 
 
Figure 9. Intragroup distribution of allocation to self. 
 
Although the majority of participants in the intergroup condition between representatives favor an 
equal allocation of points within their group, there is a second peak between 70 and 79% visible in 
figure 9. This second peak may suggest that there are individuals that are entirely more self-
interested than others, regardless of the person they are interacting with. In order to investigate this 
supposition, the beliefs about the allocation of points within the group are compared with the 
allocated points in the previous intergroup dictator game. If the assumption of the existence of 
individuals universally more self-interested holds, it is expected that individuals allocating the most 
for their group in the dictator game will also be the ones that assert to keep the most within group 
allocation. However, this is not the case. Indeed, no correlation is found between the two variables 
(correlation of 0.052; Appendix 10.4 displays a graphical representation of the relation between the 
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two variables). Hence, participants keeping more points to themselves within the group are not the 
ones that are less cooperative in the dictator game. 
 
In conclusion, although the collected data does show a decrease in cooperation between the 
conditions, the findings on the hypotheses related to the two discerned effects – the in-group effect 
and the effect of the representative role – do not display any significant result. However, analyzing 
the results applying the same comparison used in previous studies displays that the interaction 
between the two effects does influence individuals’ cooperation. Indeed, individuals representing a 
group mate and interacting in an intergroup context demonstrate to be less cooperative. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the mechanisms behind the representative role exhibits that 
representatives care about the people they are responsible for, supporting the accountability 
hypothesis more than the implicit justification hypothesis. Table 7 summarizes the results presented 
in this chapter in relation to the relative hypotheses.  
 
Table 7: Summary of the results  
Hypothesis 1 In situations of intergroup relations conducted by two members of 
different groups, subjects are less cooperative towards out-group 
members than in situations of interpersonal relations. 
✗ 
 
Hypothesis 2 In situations of intergroup relations conducted by representatives, 
subjects are less cooperative towards out-group members than in 




Hypothesis 3 Representatives feel accountable for their in-group members and 
therefore will be cooperative. 
✓ 
 
Hypothesis 4 The representative role implicitly allows the justification of the 
pursuit of their selfish interests; therefore, they will be less 





Giorgio Cassina  Discussion 
	 45 
7 Discussion 
The goals of this thesis were to investigate the influence of the representative role on individuals’ 
cooperative behaviors and to find out which mechanism lies behind the effect of the representative 
role. However, to overcome the methodological shortcoming that characterizes previous studies on 
the representative role, I decided to develop and use a new experimental design. The design aimed 
at discerning the in-group favoritism and the representation effect confused in previous studies and 
at causally determining the relation that representation has with individuals’ cooperation.  
The practicality of Amazon MTurk as a platform – where a stable and constant subject pool of 
participants different from the classical student pool in laboratory experiments is present – led me to 
conduct the experiment online. However, being aware of the disadvantages of the online platform in 
terms of the composition of the participants’ pool, the experimental sample was controlled for the 
presence of nonnaïvé participants and for the presence of ‘spammers’. The sample demographics 
confirm participants’ nonnaïvité to MTurk in general and to economic experiments in particular and 
that the majority of participants (81%) are full-time employed or self-employed meaning that 
MTurk is not their main income source. However, these unsurprising results have been shown to 
not influence the findings of previous studies on MTurk (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011; 
Mason and Suri 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). Indeed, the presented results proved 
to be robust also when controlling for participants’ experience with MTurk and economic games. 
In relation to the hypotheses on the two discerned effects on individuals’ cooperative 
behaviors, the results suggest that group members’ cooperation level does not differ neither from 
normal individuals nor from representatives. Indeed, the presented results confirm neither the in-
group favoritism effect displayed in other studies (Brewer 1979; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002; 
Balliet, Wu, and De Dreu 2014) nor the presented effect of the representative role. However, the 
non-significance of the results related to both the in-group favoritism effect and the effect of the 
representative role could have been caused by the inefficacy of the intergroup treatment. Indeed, as 
the validity check related to the treatment reveals, the imagination procedure used to create minimal 
groups and an intergroup context for the dictator game appears to partially fail its purpose (42 % of 
participants did not feel to belong to their group). Thus, participants could have behaved as 
perceiving to be in an interpersonal context (i.e. they did not identify themselves as group members) 
also in both the intergroup condition and the intergroup condition between representatives. 
Although the imagination procedure – in comparison to other procedures – is useful to avoid the 
participants’ deception, the results also lead to question the overall validity of the procedure to 
create a minimal group in the context of online experiments. As a complement to Pinter and 
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Greenwald’s findings (2011) it is found that in the online environment, the imagination procedure is 
insufficient to establish an intergroup interaction context.  
However, the additional analysis that omitted subjects who gave negative responses to the 
validity check did not display different results. Thus, although the inefficacy of the intergroup 
treatment could have played a role, the insignificant results could also be caused by the insufficient 
strength of the social identity created. Again, different from a physical interaction, the online 
context could require a stronger social identity to foster an intergroup interaction. A social identity 
created on the basis of an art preference, then, appears to be an insufficient condition to establish a 
minimal group. This would explain not only the results regarding the in-group favoritism effect, but 
also those related to the effect of the representative role, since they are related to the strength of the 
representative’s social identity and the feeling of interacting in an intergroup situation. 
By conducting the same comparison used in previous studies to investigate the effect of the 
representative role on individuals’ behaviors (Song, Cadsby, and Morris 2004; Diekmann 1997; 
Humphrey and Renner 2011), I acquire significant results supporting the thesis that representatives 
interacting in an intergroup context are less cooperative than individuals interacting in an 
interpersonal situation. However, differently from previous studies, these results are not interpreted 
as findings showing the effect of the representative role on individuals’ cooperation level 
individually. Rather, the results are considered as due to the interaction between the in-group 
favoritism effect and the effect of being a representative. Since being a representative corresponds 
to a particular type of group member, this comparison does not allow the detachment of the two 
situations and the understanding of only the actual effect of the representative role. Thus, the 
methodological criticism highlighted in this thesis still remains important and worth considering for 
future investigations. Indeed, the question regarding which effect is responsible for the significant 
difference or in which way the two effects interact could not be answered with the collected results. 
The results further display that representatives care about their group mate’s opinion and 
wellbeing. Indeed, representatives seem to feel accountable for the represented in-group members 
and, therefore, divided the group endowment equally within them. By supporting the theoretical 
argumentation related to the importance of the represented expectations for representatives 
(accountability mechanism), the results reject the hypothesis related to the implicit justification 
mechanism assuming that representatives strategically use their role just to legitimize their self-
interest to others.  
Since the data on the intragroup distribution of points comes from a hypothetical question in 
the post-experimental survey, it should be noted that the data is based on beliefs and not on actual 
behaviors. Therefore, given that the existence of the hypothetical bias (i.e. the difference between 
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belief and actual behaviors) is a well-documented phenomenon which asserts that the temptation of 
earning money shifts individuals’ behaviors towards more self-interested actions (Neill et al. 1994; 
Loomis 2011), it can be expected that experimental data would provide a slightly different 
allocation distribution. Nevertheless, these results display an interesting insight into participants’ 
beliefs that support their feeling of being responsible towards their group mates. 
Finally, this thesis – considered as a starting point for an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon 
of representation – presents a new perspective that tries to solve the previous methodological 
shortcoming of comparing individuals’ behaviors in interpersonal situations with representatives’ 
behaviors in intergroup contexts. Indeed, the results suggest that there is no difference in behaviors 
between simple group members and group representatives. Although this finding could have been 
affected by the minimal group procedure applied in the conducted experiment, it still reveals the 
importance of the new experimental design developed in this thesis; namely, that in order to 
causally determine the effect of the representative role, representatives’ behaviors should be 
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8 Conclusion 
The vast presence of the representative role in society calls for a precise causal analysis of the 
phenomenon. This phenomenon has received a lot of attention in different theoretical traditions: 
from negotiation studies (Folmer et al. 2012; Blake and Mouton 1961; Druckman, Solomon, and 
Zechmeister 1972; Benton and Druckman 1974; Haccoun and Klimoski 1975; Enzle, Harvey, and 
Wright 1992) to classical economic game theoretical approaches (Song, Cadsby, and Morris 2004; 
Diekmann 1997; Humphrey and Renner 2011). However, this thesis criticizes the methodological 
approaches of these studies and suggests a new design aimed at investigating how being a 
representative influences individuals’ cooperative behaviors. To my knowledge this study is the 
first one trying to accomplish this objective by means of applying a new experimental design. 
Furthermore, the suggested design is not only more accurate from a methodological point of view 
than previous ones, but by looking at the results, it remains questionable whether previous studies 
really found an effect of the representative role or just an artefact of the interaction of representative 
and in-group favoritism effect. Therefore, it remains unresolved whether and to which extent there 
is something that can be called representative effect in real life. 
The results did not support the existence of the effect of the representative role on individuals’ 
cooperation alone. However, I was able to support results from previous studies and provide a better 
and more methodologically accurate interpretation of the findings: the interaction of the in-group 
favoritism effect and the effect of the representative role does have an influence on individuals’ 
cooperative behavior. Furthermore, the results provide insights into representatives’ care for their 
group mates. However, whether the representative effect alone actually influences individuals’ 
behaviors still remains an unanswered question.  
This thesis was a first step into the causal analysis of the actual effect of the representative 
role. However, the findings of this thesis display that further studies on the topic are necessary. 
Specifically, the conducted experiment sheds light on three possible future researches: (1) future 
analyses comparing group members’ and representatives’ cooperative behaviors should use a better 
intergroup induction procedure creating a stronger group identification. These analyses are required 
to comprehend the causal relation between the representative role and individuals’ cooperation level 
better and to foster new studies on the general effect of the representative role; (2) to improve the 
understanding of how the representative role works and what mechanism actually lies on the basis 
of representation, further analysis, comparing accountability and implicit justification aspects, 
should collect data on actual behaviors and not only on subjects’ beliefs; (3) the limitation of the 
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imagination procedure applied to create minimal groups suggests the need for an in depth 
investigation into how this procedure works in the online context. 
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In the following section all the experimental screens for each of the three conditions are presented, 
as well as how the possibility to dropout from the experiment was displayed to the participants.  


































10.1.2 Intergroup Condition 
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10.2 Randomization Control 
In this chapter of the appendix, the relationship between the assignment of the treatment condition 
and all the control variables collected in the post-experimental survey were tested. Each relationship 
is displayed visually through contingency tables or histograms and then statistically tested. 
 
Supplementary table 1: Participants’ distribution between the treatments 
on the basis of their native language (dichotomy: native English or not) 
 Interpersonal Intergroup Representatives 
Non-native 
English 
7 4 6 
Native English 47 47 48 
 
The pairwise comparison between treatment conditions does not display any significant relationship 
between the treatment assignment and participants’ native language. 
 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.53 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.74 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.84 
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Supplementary table 2: Participants’ distribution between the treatments on the basis 
of their education level 
 Interpersonal Intergroup Representatives 
Some High school, no 
degree 
- - - 
High school Diploma 6 5 8 
Some college, no degree 14 13 10 
Associate’s Degree 8 8 11 
Bachelor’s Degree 24 22 21 
Graduate Degree 
(Master’s or Ph. D.) 
2 3 4 
 
The Chi squared test does not show any significant relationship between the treatment assignment 
and participants’ education level (p = 0.944). 
 
Since the categories in the variable employment status are not exclusive categories, each value is 
operationalized as a dichotomous variable (i.e. full-time employee or not). For the sake of 
simplicity and brevity, supplementary table 3 displays the values as if they were a fraction of all the 
participants in one condition: 39 out of 54 participants in the interpersonal condition are full-time 
employees, therefore 15 out of 54 participants in this condition are not full-time employees. 
 
Supplementary table 3: Participants’ distribution between the treatments on the basis 
of their employment status 
 Interpersonal Intergroup Representatives 
Full-time employee 39/54 35/51 35/54 
Part-time employee 4/54 1/51 5/54 
Self-employed 7/54 7/51 7/54 
Out of work and looking 
for work 
2/54 3/51 2/54 
Homemaker 2/54 1/51 4/54 
Student 1/54 2/51 0/54 
Retired or permanently 
disabled 
2/54 2/51 1/54 
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The pairwise comparison between treatment conditions does not display any significant relationship 
between the treatment assignment and all the dichotomous variables in supplementary table 3. 
 
Full-time employee 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.83 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.84 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.53 
 
Part-time employee 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.36 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.20 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
 
Self-employed 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
 
Out of work and looking for work 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.67 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.67 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
 
Homemaker 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.36 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.68 
 
Student 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.23 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.50 
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Retired or permanently disabled 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.61 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
 
Supplementary table 4: Participants’ distribution between the treatments 
on the basis of experience with similar games 
 Interpersonal Intergroup Representatives 
No Experience 22 16 21 
Experience 32 35 33 
 
The pairwise comparison between treatment conditions does not display any significant relationship 
between the treatment assignment and participants’ previous experience with similar games. 
 
Interpersonal-intergroup comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.42 
Intergroup-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.54 
Interpersonal-intergroup between representatives comparison: two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 1 
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Supplementary figure 1. Distribution of variable age: a comparison between the three conditions. 
 
The analysis of variance shows only a small relationship between the treatment assignment and age 
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Supplementary figure 2. Distribution of variable income: a comparison between the three conditions. 
 
The analysis of variance does not show any relationship between the treatment assignment and 
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Supplementary figure 3. Distribution of variable MTurk experience: a comparison between the three conditions. 
 
The analysis of variance does not show any relationship between the treatment assignment and 
participants’ general experience with MTurk (Eta squared of 0.002). 
10.3 Supplementary Analysis: Controlling for the Validity of the Intergroup Treatment 
The additional analysis is conducted by filtering for the variable considering the validity of the 
intergroup treatment. Supplementary figure 4 displays the filtered distribution of allocation for each 
treatment conditions. As the following hypotheses tests display, increasing the validity of the 
treatment does not improve the results. 
 
Hypothesis 1: In situations of intergroup relations conducted by two members of different groups, 
subjects are less cooperative towards out-group members than in situations of interpersonal 
relations. 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.20) does not show a significant difference in the allocation 
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Hypothesis 2: In situations of intergroup relations conducted by representatives, subjects are less 
cooperative towards out-group members than in situations of intergroup relations conducted by two 
members of different groups. 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.70) does not show a significant difference in the allocation 
distribution between the intergroup and the intergroup between representatives condition. 
It has to be noted that the filtering process created some ties between the observations that could 
have influenced the calculation of the p. 
 
Supplementary figure 4. Filtered distribution of allocation to self/group: a comparison between the three conditions 
(for comparability, the points represented in the figure for the intergroup condition between representatives do not 
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10.4 Graphical Representation of the Relation Between the Allocated Points in the 
Dictator Game and the Self-Reported Data on the Intragroup Distribution of Points 
	
Supplementary figure 5. Relation between dictator game allocations and belief on the intragroup allocation (for 
comparability, the points represented in the figure for the intergroup condition between representatives do not represent 
the group allocation, but they are considered as the points each member of the group receives) 
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